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PREFERENCE OF A STATE AS A CREDITOR.
The Court of Appeals of New York, in the case of In re. Car-
negie Trust Co., 99 N. E., lO96, decided in November, 1912, held
that the State had succeeded to the prerogative right to have its
debts preferred to those of ordinary creditors, which the English
Crown had at common law. In this case the bank was insolvent,
and the State Superintendent of Banks, by authority of the
New York Banking Law (Consol. Laws, 19o2, C. 2) had taken
possession of the insolvent bank. While he was winding up its
affairs, the State Treasurer put in the State's claim for $07,000,
the amount of the State's unsecured deposit, and demanded that
it be preferred over the claims of other depositors. The referee
denied this preference, and the Special Term confirmed his re-
port; but the Appellate Division (136 N. Y. Supp., 466) reversed
the order of the Special Term and the Court of Appeals decided
in favor of the State. There is no statute giving the State this prior-
ity in New York, but the Court held that under their Constitution
they adopted the common law of England as it was in April, 1775,
except such parts as were repugnant to the Constitution. It is
admitted by every authority that at common law the King was
,entitled to this preference. Bac. Abr. title Ex'r K., 734; 3 Black.
CoM., 420; I Kent CoM., 248. The argument of the Court is
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that the King and his personal prerogatives are abrogated as
repugnant to the Constitution; but "his sovereignty, powers,
functions and duties, in so far as they pertain to civil govern-
ment, now devolve upon the people of the State," and therefore
the people of the State as sovereign are entitled to this prefer-
ence. The idea that the people of the State had succeeded to
all the rights of the English Crown had been held on other ques-
tions. Wendell v. Jackson, 8 Wend., 183; People v. Kerkimer,
4 Cowen, 345; Lansing v. Smith, 4 Wend., 9.
The principal case acknowledges there is a direct conflict on
this question. Many States have settled it by express statutes
giving the State priority to a greater or less extent. Conn. Rev.,
19o2, Sec. 288; Mass. Rev., 1902, C. 163, Sec. 118; R. I. Rev.,
1909, Sec. 1238; Maine Rev., 1903, C. 72, Sec. 42; Ohio Rev.,
1910, Secs. 10714, 11138; Wash. Rem. & Ball. Statutes, Sec.
1568; Fla. Rev., 19o6, Sec. 2404. Pennsylvania, oddly enough,
has a statute passed in 1794, "which directs debts due to the State
from deceased persons shall be last paid." Commonwealth v.
Lewis, 6 Binn., 266. Louisiana seems to have had such a statute
before 1825, but the Code of 1825 expressly took away all pref-
.erences to the State. State v. Wright's Admr., 8 Mart. (N. S.),
316. The preference of the United States, Justice Story says,
"'does not stand upon any sovereign prerogatives, but is exclu-
sively founded upon the actual provisions of their own statutes."
United States v. State Bank of N. C., 6 Peters, 29.
In the principal case the Court says, "We thus find our Court
fully committed upon the question under discussion," referring
to Central Trust Co. v. N. City & N. R. R. Co., 1IO N. Y., 250,
decided itt 1888. But that was a much stronger case for the
State in that the claim of the State was for taxes due while a
receiver was operating the road for the mortgagees. That case
and the principal case go back to a mere dictum, in the case of
Receivership of the Columbian Ins. Co., 3 Abb. Dec. Ct. of App.,
239, decided in 1866. In this case too, the claim of the city was
for personal taxes, and although it was "unnecessary to express
.an opinion on this question," Judge Porter said, "there is great
force in the argument in support of the broad proposition, that
the people of this State have succeeded to all the prerogatives of
the English Crown, so far as they are essential to the efficient
exercise of powers inherent in the nature of civil government,
.and that there is the same priority of right here, in respect to the
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payment of taxes, which existed at common law in favor of the
public treasury." But it should be noticed that this-the begin-
ning of the doctrine in New York-is but a dictum, and is made
only to extend to taxes. The New York rule was formulated
very carefully by its Court of Appeals in 1897, in Wise v. Wise &
Co., 153 N. Y., 507. The Court said in that case: "In this coun-
try," the right of a State to be preferred "exists only in two cases.
(i) Where the preference is expressly given by statute, and (2)
where before the fund has come into the hands of the receiver or
trustee, a warrant or some other legal process has issued for the
collection of the tax or debt, and the fund has come into his
hands impressed with a lien in favor of the Government in con-
sequence of the proceedings for collection." Where there is no
statute or lien, "there is no controlling authority for preferring
such a claim (for taxes which had become due subsequent to the
attachment by a creditor) over specific prior liens in favor of
creditors obtained by levy under attachments or executions." The
principal case says this case only settles that a simple claim of the
State is not to take preference over prior specific liens. It seems
as though this case holds also that a simple debt due the State as
in the principal case is not entitled to preference, for the facts of
the principal case surely do not come under either of the two sin-
gle instances in which alone Wise v. Wise & Co., supra, holds the
State is entitled to priority. This surely is the way the Federal
District Court interpreted Wise v. Wise & Co. in Robinson v.
Mutual Reserve Life Ins. Co., 175 Fed., 624. In that case, in
19o9, the Court denied the State's prior claim, for taxes, since
there was no statute, and it had not been charged by a tax lien
before insolvency. In 1911 the Federal Court had occasion again
to construe Wise v. Wise & Co., and denied that the State suc-
ceeded "as sovereign to all the prerogatives of the British Crown,
among others the right to a preference for debts due it over all
other creditors. It has been expressly held that taxes due the
State have no priority of payment out of a fund in Court for dis-
tribution, unless the priority was expressly given by statute, or
unless the fund has come into Court impressed with a priority for
the tax." The Court in the principal case did not refer to these
two recent decisions in the Federal Court as to the law of
New York, and their idea as to the meaning of Wise v. Wise &
Co. It is hard to see how the principal case does not overthrow
the rule of Wise v. Wise & Co.
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Whether the rule giving the State a preference is in force in a
.State merely by the adoption of the common law is, indeed, as the
New York Courts found it, and as said in In re Devlin, 18o Fed.,
170, an "extremely doubtful and difficult question." It came
squarely before the Georgia Court in Robinson v. The Bank of
Darien, 18 Ga., 65, and the Court said it "constituted a branchi of
the common law of England, and as such was adopted in this State
by the Act of 1774." They admitted it could not exist with all its
English incidents, but their argument is that it is necessary, to pro-
tect the revenue of the State, and "to enable the State to accomplish
the ends of its institution." In a later case, Seay v. Bank of Rome,
.66 Ga., 609, they say: "it has been the well settled rule in Georgia
from the organization of its government as an independent sov-
.ereign State down to the present time that debts due her have
priority." Tennessee in 1907 expressly held this royal preroga-
-tive "was a part of the common law transmitted to this State from
North Carolina," in Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Rainey, i2o
Tenn., 357.
Maryland has had several interesting cases on this subject.
The earliest case on it, Davidson v. Clayland, i Har. & J., 546, in
1805, decided that the State was entitled to a preference, but based
the opinion on an old statute of 1778, which gave the State a
prior lien as soon as it commenced a suit. But in Smith v.
State, 5 Gill, 45, in 1847, it is laid down flatly that the State is a
preferred creditor from the adoption of the old common law;
with no mention of a statute in the opinion. This is reiterated
,and treated as settled law in State v. Baltimore, io Md., 504, and
in Orem Ex'x v. Wrightson, 51 Md., 34, and in equity, in Green's
Estate, 4 Md. Ch., 349. The great case in Maryland and perhaps
-the leading one on the subject, is State of Maryland v. Bank of
Maryland, 6 Gill & J., 205, decided in 1834. The State had de-
posited $50,000 in the bank, and claimed priority to the funds in
the hands of a trustee for creditors. The Court said the rule
giving the State priority was well settled; it was "too late to deny
it now. It is not inconsistent with the principles or spirit of
our political institutions; it is not opposed to a sense of right that
the interests of all should prevail over that of an individual when
it can be asserted without disturbing vested rights." But this
case was decided against the State because of a very important
limitation put on the rule by this case. They hold that a bona fide
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assignment for the benefit of creditors "protects the property in
the hands of the trustee against the common law priority of the
State." They enforced this rule against the State in 1905 in
State v. Williams, Ioi Md., 529.
This rule that a bona fide assignment to a trustee for creditors,
whereby the debtor entirely divests himself of control and title,
defeats this priority of the State or Crown, is established in
England. King v. Watson, 3 Price, 6. Wyoming, in State v.
Foster, 5 Wyo., i99, enforced this limitation of the rule, defeating
the State's claim to priority, but saying, "it is not necessary to
decide that the common law prerogative of the King in this respect
is applicable in this country-on which the authorities are con-
flicting." The Federal Court, while expressly saying they would
not decide whether the common law as to priority of the sovereign
was in force or not in Kansas, would not give a preference to the
State, for there had been a general and legal assignment for the
benefit of creditors. In re Devlin, 18o Fed., 170. Whether the
principal case would come under this limitation of the rule or
not is doubtful. There surely was not a voluntary assignment
for the benefit of creditors, and yet the entire assets of the debtor
were taken away from it and vested for the benefit of all the
creditors in a trustee or receiver, whom the law arbitrarily ap-
pointed. It would hardly seem that the State would voluntarily
do an act which would ipso facto defeat its priority, and yet on
the reasons assigned by the cases, the total relinquishment of the
debtor of all control over* his property and the dedicating of it to
all his creditors generally, to be divided equally, before the State
has asserted its priority, it almost seems the same effect should
flow from this involuntary assignment that would from a volun-
tary one. The same result attaches when a receiver is appointed
at the request of creditors. Middlesex Co. v. State Bank, 30 N. J.
Eq., 311. The principal case never mentioned this phase of the
rule, confining itself to a scanty review of its own decisions merely.
Returning again to the consideration of whether by adopting
the common law simply, this rule was adopted so as to favor the
State, instead of the Crown, we find it is denied strongly in South
Carolina in two cases decided by the same judge, although one
was in law and one in equity. State v. Harris, 2 Bailey, 598;
Klinck v. Kleckley, 2 Hill (Eq.), 25o . The same rule is laid
down in State v. Cleary, 2 Hill, 6oo. In State v. Harris, supra,
the judge waxes eloquent and rhetorical in his denial of this com-
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mon law privilege. "It cannot be that the incidents of royalty
are to adhere to the vestal of republicanism, when she has trod
the diadem of kings under her feet and broken the sceptre of
power." He admits the sovereign can pass laws giving itself
this preference, but it is not an incident before it is willed, or why,
he asks with a good deal of force, should the United States have
to assert it by an express statute? "Taxes," he adds, "debts which
are due to the State as a sovereign for the protection of both the
citizen and property, are entitled to a preference." Michigan in
191o refused to hold that such a priority exists without a statute,.
in Zimmerman v. Chelsea, 127 N. W., 351. New Jersey decided
contra to the principal case in Freeholders of Middlesex County
v. State Bank, 30 N. J. Eq., 311. They say in this case, if it
existed, it is queer it had never been exercised in over a hundred
years; and if they adopt it at all they would have to adopt it in
all its "iron rigor," for it has not been modified by statute. They
deny it absolutely, but also hold the State is not entitled to it here
in any event, for there had been a receiver appointed, which di-
vested the debtor of title and defeated any priority the State might
have had, even under the English rule.
The principal case is to be distinguished from a line of cases
where the public moneys were deposited in violation of law and
then mingled with general assets. In these cases the State is.
held to have a preferred claim on the ground of 'a trust; the
public money is held by the bank as a trust fund which the general
creditors cannot reach. State v. Bruce, 1O2 P. (Idaho), 831 ;
State v. Throm, 6 Idaho, 323.
It can be seen that there is a hopeless conflict on this question.
The difficulty of settling it judicially is shown by the decisions in
New York. The simplest way to settle it seems to be by statute .
it seems a case peculiarly calling for a statutory reglation, as
most of the points in insolvency and bankruptcy are regulated in
this way. As to whether by adoption of the common law merely
this prerogative was given to the State, there seems to be about
the same amount of authority and reason on either side, as far
as taxes are concerned, at least.
VOLUNTARILY INCURRING DANGER TO SAVE LIFE OF ANOTHER PER-
SON AS CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
In the recent case of Perpich v. Leetonia Mining Co., 137 N. W.,
12, it-was held, that a person who voluntarily attempted to rescue
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one whose life was imperiled by the negligence of another might
recover therefor from the negligent person if the act of attempted
r~scue was not extreme recklessness.
The plaintiff in the principal case left a position of safety and
attempted to rescue one who had been placed in a perilous situa-
tion through the defendant's negligence. The plaintiff was in-
jured in the explosion which followed. The Court said that the
act of the plaintiff was not negligence per se. This decision
seems to be in accord with the weight of authpority both in
England and the United States. The law recognizes the duty
of everyone to society in general, and justifies the assuming of
greater risks to protect human life than would be sanctioned
under other circumstances. In this class of cases the "duty" is
more of a moral obligation, than a legal duty.
In the case of Eckert v. Long Isl nd R. R. Co., 43 N. Y., 503,
a man rescued a boy at the sacrifice of his own life, from an ap-proaching train. Ijis widow brought an action ag.inst the rail-
road company which had been negligent in running its train ,t
a higher rate of speed than that allowed in the town. The plain-
tiff recovered judgment. In the opinion the Court said: "The
law has so high a regard for human life that it will not impute
negligence to an effort tp preserve it, unless the exposure is clearly
rash and reckless." Ip the case of L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Orr,
121 Ala., 4 89, the Court said that risking one's life in an effort tp
save the life of another cannot be said to be a rash and reckless
act if the appearance justifies a belief that he can effect a rescue,
even though he shall also have a reason to believe, and in fact
does believe, that he may fail or receive grievous injury himself.
These two decisions are among the leading American authori-
ties on this subject and indicate that the Courts do not scan very
closely the grounds of hope a person may have in going into danger
in order to save others, where exigency demands instantaneous
decision and action. There are expressions in some of the cases,
however, to the effect that the intervention must be in circum-
stances where the intervener can act "without incurring great
danger to himself." This undoubtedly is an erroneous test.
The "duty" or "obligation" does not become any the less by the
greater imminency of the danger. The act may be instinctive,
or deliberate, and should be justified in either case if there is a
bona fide attempt to save life or limb. It has been justly said
that there is no legal duty on the plaintiff to rescue one whc is in
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danger of loss of life, and it is clear that in the Eckert case supra,
the child could not have maintained an action against the plain-
±iff's husband for not rescuing it; his act was purely voluntary,
but it was justifiable, and the negligence of the defendant was
-nbt. In the case of Donahoe v. Wabash R. R. Co., 83 Mo., 560,
it was held that the railroad company could not be made liable
for injuries suffered by one who, with the most praiseworthy
motive, rushed in front of a train to rescue another who was un-
lawfully on the track, the train being managed prudently. In
this case neither party was at fault and there could be no re-
.covery.
The privilege of rescue under obvious danger is not to be ex-
tended to cases in which mere property is imperiled, or even, it
has been held, to the rescue of sensitive animals, such as horses;
.although taking a moderate degree of personal risk ought not to
'be considered a fault. Deville v. Southern & R. Co., 50 Cal.,
383. The general rule therefore seems to be that it is not con-
tributory negligence per se for one with reasonable prudence to
expose himself to danger, for the purpose of saving his own or
.another's property from injury. Luming v. Illinois Central R. R,
Co., 81 Iowa, 246. In the case of Taylor v. Home Tel. Co., 163
Mich., 458, the employees of the defendant company negligently
removed a cock from a city water main, and permitted the water
to flow into the apartment in which the plaintiff was a care taker.
-The plaintiff, in attempting to close the window through which
-the water was entering, became soaked with the water and illness
followed. The Court found that she had deliberately walked
-into the water, the maxim volenti non fit injuria applied, and that
she was not entitled to recover. It would seem therefore that
-the sound rule upon Which recovery is based depends upon the
-reasonableness of the plaintiff's act.
The justification for the act in attempting to rescue one whose
'life is in danger is, that the negligence of the defendant working
-through a person's feelings has caused him to act. In so risking his
own life he does not become a volunteer if the act is not one of
-extreme recklessness. One text writer justifies the act on the
.ground that the employer has given an implied order, in case of
.danger to life, to assist as much as possible. This "implied
.order," if you can choose to call it by that name, arises from the
general duty to perserve human life, and the right to recover for
injuries received in attempting to save life or property which has
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been imperiled by the negligence of another depends upon the
reasonableness of the act.
GARNISHMENT OF THE CONTENTS OF A SAFETY DEPOSIT BOX.
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island in the recent case of
Tillinghast v. Johnson, 82 Atl., 788, reaches the conclusion that a
safety deposit company is subject to garnishment as to contents
bf a box which it receives in the ordinary course of business,
though it neither knows nor is expected to know what those con-
tents are, and the owner of the box alone has the key.
Garnishment is a proceeding by which plaintiff in action seeks
to reach the choses in action of defendant by calling into Court
some third party who has such effects in his possession or who is
indebted to the defendant. 20 Cyc., 978.
The cases are not numerous which involve the question of the
garnishment of the contents of a safety deposit box or safe.
In the case of National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 250 Ill., 584,
it is held that the relation between a safety deposit company and
lessee is that of bailee and bailor. The fact that the company
does not know and is not expected to know the character and
the description of the property deposited does not change that
relation.
The Courts which follow the doctrine of the principal case
assume that the relation between the depositor and depositary is
that of bailor and bailee, and that therefore there is possession in
the safety deposit company which will subject it to a garnishment
process. Washington, etc., Co. v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 26 App
D. C., 149.
The Court in the case of Trowbridge v. Spinning, 23 Wash.,
48, states: "At any time on the request of the defendant the gar-
nishee could put it within the power of the defendant to remove
the contents of the box and the defendant could not remove the
contents without the consent and active co6peration of the gar-
nishee. As against the defendant then the garnishee had control
of the contents of the box."
The leading case in support of the doctrine contra to that of the
principal case is Gregg v. Hilson, 8 Phila., 91, which holds that
the contents of a safety deposit compartment of which the de-
positor held the keys, and which by the contract of rental the
COMMENTS
company had no right to enter, are in possession of the depositor,
and the depositary cannot be charged as garnishee.
In the case of Gregg v. Hilson, supra, the Court said: "They
are not a debt due to the defendant or a deposit of money made
by him, or goods or chattels pawned, pledged or demised. The
contents of the safe are in the actual possession of the renter of
the safe. They have not been deposited with or demised to the
company."
"In the ordinary course of their business safe deposit com-
panies rent safes or boxes in their vaults to depositors, engaging
to maintain a guard over the vaults but retaining no right of ac-
cess in themselves. It does not receive the deposits personally
as in the case of special bank deposits, but on the contrary the
depositor himself places his property in his safe and removes it
at his pleasure, the company being ignorant of what if any prop-
erty is in the box or safe. Can it be said in any true sense that
the company is in possession of the property or that there has
been a delivery? If there is no possession and no delivery there
is no bailment." Hale on Bailments, p. 248.
Property in the vaults of a safe deposit company is subject to
seizure by direct attachment. United States v. Graff, 67 Barb.,
304.
Rood, in his work on garnishment, Sec. 54, note, states the rule
to be in accord with that stated in the principal case, and cites
United States v. Graff, supra. This, however, would appear to
be error, since in that case the action was one of attachment and
not garnishment.
His statement of the requisites of an action of garnishment
indicates the inability to garnishee. "Control must be active and
exclusive of defendant. Mere constructive possession or right
of disposition is not enough. Unless the property sought to be
garnisheed is in the actual control of garnishee so that he can
dispose of it at will he cannot be charged. Actual personal pos-
session is not necessary in order to charge the garnishee. Pos-
session of an agent is enough. Nor is it necessary that the gar-
nishee have any right to withhold the property from the de-
fendant, nor to move or handle it, provided he has it in his power
to do so." Rood on Garnishment, Sec. 52.
The cases are conclusive of the proposition that a possession is
requisite to garnishment. Bottom v. Clarke, 7 Cush. (Mass.), 487.
In the case of Trowbridge v. Spinning, supra, there was a
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statute relating to garnishment which statute gives greater powers
of investigation than those ordinarily accorded by statutes of
other States.
It is stated in 2o Cyc., p. io22, that according to the weight of
authority property or funds deposited with a safety deposit com-
pany cannot be reached by garnishment proceedings, which is
.contra to the doctrine stated in the principal case.
It is difficult to justify the theory of the Court in the principal
case. Possession has never passed from the owner or renter.
Why should its proprietor be deemed to have possession of the
effects of his tenant any more than the ordinary landlord? The
safety deposit company is a mere custodian for hire. Its duties
do not depend on a bailment relation, but on one of a contract to
guard.
